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1 Lost empires, modern maps and name
disputes
In Rome, on one side of the Via dei Fori Imperiali (the road connecting
the Coliseum and the Piazza Venezia cutting through the archaeological
excavations of the Imperial Fora) one can find some maps displaying the
successive phases of expansion of the Roman Empire. These were carved in
stone during Mussolini’s dictatorship: ‘The Empire at the Age of Trajan’ is the
crucial one, as it shows Rome at its maximum territorial expansion in the 1st and
2nd century CE.1 For its 1933 audience, the message was clear: the Italians were
now reclaiming that legacy and heritage, as if 476 CE had never happened.2
* Lecturer in Law, Kent Law School, Canterbury. A previous draft of this note was presented at
the workshop on “Judicial Conversations: the Role of Judiciaries in Resolving International
Conflicts” hosted by Law and Conflict at Durham (LCD) and by the Centre for Criminal
Law and Criminal Justice on 26 and 27 April 2012 at University College Durham. Many
thanks to the organizers and all the participants for their comments and to the Modern
Law Review for co-sponsoring the event. The author is also indebted to Federica Cittadino,
Alessandra Iacono, Viktorija Jakimovska, Irena Micajkova, MarkoMilanović, Ioanna Pervou,
Judge Bruno Simma, Rumiana Yotova and Demian Zucal for their help and for their kind
comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
1 A picture thereof may be seen at <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Roma-Via_
dei_fori_imperiali.jpg> (byDanKamminga) [last accessed 22 April 2012]. Interestingly for our
present purposes, the map includes ‘Macedonia’ as a large area from Albania to the Aegean
Sea, in a manner which seems to include all of Northern Greece, while Acaia (Achaea) is the
name given to the Southern part of Greece, but there are no borders between provinces of
the pax romana.
2 On the legacy of ‘imperial Rome’ as a crucial element in the construction of Fascist national
identity, see e.g. P. Costa,Civitas: Storia della cittadinanza in Europa—vol. 4, L'età dei totalitarismi
e della democrazia (Laterza, 2008), at 283 (esp. note 196 and accompanying text).
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For a state which was only about 70 years old in 1933, this was a ludicrous
claim—and yet much pain was caused in many places, including the Balkans, by
the disastrous nationalist ideology underpinning that assertion. How that story
ended is an apt reminder that arguments based on the geographical boundaries
of some past historical entity are seldom a good idea, whichever side they come
from.
Ancient maps of lost empires feature prominently in the on-going ‘denom-
inational conflict’ between the Hellenic Republic (‘Greece’ hereinafter) and the
country referred to within the United Nations and other international orga-
nizations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (‘Makedonija’ here-
inafter).3 Ever since the independence of Makedonija from Yugoslavia more
than twenty years ago, Greece has continuously objected to the name ‘Republic
of Macedonia’. Among other reasons, this is because ‘Makedonia / Μακεδονία’
has been the name of a large territorial unit of Northern Greece since 1914.4 The
difference is still unresolved, but a discrete issue connected to it was adjudicated
upon by the International Court of Justice on 5 December 2011. The Court held
that Greece had breached one of its obligations under the 1995 bilateral Interim
Accord by objecting to the admission of Makedonija to NATO in the run up to
the Bucharest Summit of 2008.5
This article reviews the ICJ judgment and discusses its impact on the name
dispute. The aim here is not to provide a detailed analysis of all the many
interesting legal issues raised by the case.6 Rather, I intend to show that, despite
3 See SC Res. 817, 7 April 1993 and 1995 Interim Accord, 1891 UNTS 3. The present author will
use the transliteration of the constitutional name of the Republika Makedonija (Република
Македонија) without any translation in order to distinguish it from the Northern Greek
region of Makedonia / Μακεδονία (and avoid the equally contested acronym FYROM). This
should be seen as a purely pragmatic compromise, not an expression of a view (let alone a
proposal) on the final solution of the ‘name issue’ discussed here.
4 “Greece was the first to use the term ‘Macedonia’, as early as 1914, to designate a large
administrative unit of its new territories”, as the Agent of Greece put it before the Court:
Translation of Verbatim Record of Oral Proceedings, CR 2011/8, 24 March 2011 (3 pm),
available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16378.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012],
at 8. What the Agent meant is that, as between Greece and Makedonija, Greece was the first
to use the name—the term ‘Macedonia’ had obviously been used before.
5
Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia v Greece), Judgment (not yet published), 5 December 2011, available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012].
6 In that regard see e.g. A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Legality of Veto to NATO Accession: Comment on
the ICJ’s Decision in theDispute between fYRMacedonia andGreece’, EJIL: Talk!, 7 December
2011, available at <http://www.ejiltalk.org/legality-of-veto-to-nato-accession> [last accessed
22 April 2012].
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the formal separation between the name dispute and the object of the legal
dispute before the ICJ, the Court’s judgment can in fact be construed as an
intervention in the name dispute. As such, it was perhaps at the limits of the
Court’s jurisdiction under the terms of Article 21(2) of the Interim Accord.
However, irrespective of the jurisdictional question, and notwithstanding the
dismissive remarks of NATO officials as to its immediate practical impact,7
the judgment might perform a useful function towards the long-awaited final
resolution of the name dispute, because it clarified some of the respective legal
positions of the parties.
Before proceeding any further, one might wonder why the name question
is so important. On one level, this is a dispute about ownership of cultural
heritage: who has the best claim to be the ‘real inheritor’ of ‘historical’
Macedonia, the land of Philip II and Alexander the Great, which at some
point became an empire spanning from Egypt to India? On both sides,
the arguments are often the modern-day equivalent of those carved stone
maps of 1933. Yet, even the most biased historical accounts recognize at
least some shared heritage: at some point in history, there was indeed
a geographical entity called ‘Macedonia’ covering both the current Greek
region of Makedonia/Μακεδονία and (at least parts of) Makedonija and other
neighbouring countries.8 However, the boundaries of this ‘historic’ Macedonia
(and its exclusively Hellenic characterization) are still a matter of dispute, with
both parties to the conflict often making claims as to the ‘percentage’ of that
ancient land that ‘belongs’ to them.9 This is not a trivial disagreement: for
both Makedonija and Greece, it runs deep into matters of national identity.10
It is thus not surprising that maps included in primary school textbooks
featured prominently in the pleadings of the parties before the ICJ,11 alongside
7 See NATO’s Secretary General statement, 5 December 2011, available at
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-50672CA8-1A1DD013/natolive/news_81678.htm>
[last accessed 22 April 2012].
8 See e.g. G. C. Papavizas, Claiming Macedonia: The Struggle for the Heritage, Territory and Name
of the Historic Hellenic Land (McFarland, 2006), at 221 (the author, who seeks to discuss the
history of “the Macedonian question from a Greek perspective”, a contrario concedes that
“part” of Makedonija “belonged to historic Macedonia”).
9 See e.g. supra, note 5, at 8.
10 It also raises questions as to the exploitation of these issues by the educational and political
elites of both countries, now and at some very complex turning points during the Twentieth
Century.
11 In the Counter-Memorial of Greece there are no less than 56 references to textbooks in use in
the elementary schools of the RepublikaMakedonija, whichGreece deems in breach ofMake-
donija’s obligations under the Interim Accord on various grounds. See Counter-Memorial
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gastronomic detours on the ‘real’ ownership of moussaka.12
In terms of cultural heritage, the question is obviously not for international
lawyers to solve—archaeologists, historians and anthropologists are much bet-
ter placed to reach some conclusions (or at least explain why a conclusion can-
not be reached).13 Yet, very practical concerns underlie the cultural aspects of
the dispute.14 In Greek eyes, the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ is unacceptable
because it is an “historical injustice”15 which may imply “irredentist” territo-
rial claims over its Northern territorial unit named Makedonia/Μακεδονία—
especially in light of the complex relationship between Tito’s Yugoslavia and
Greece (a situation not helped by certain declarations made by authorities and
politicians inMakedonija in the early 1990s).16 Initially, Greece opposed any use
of the term ‘Macedonia’ in the name of its neighbour, but its current position
is that a compound name distinguishing it from Greek Makedonia/Μακεδονία
would be acceptable.17 On the other hand, in Makedonija’s eyes this is an “en-
tirely absurd” dispute.18 Makedonija insists that it has a right to choose its own
name; that there are no territorial claims implied in calling itself ‘Macedonia’
(as recognized inter alia by the Badinter Commission in 1992);19 and that both
of Greece, 19 January 2010, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16356.pdf>
[last accessed 22 April 2012], passim. Further references may be found both in the Rejoinder
and in the oral proceedings.
12 Verbatim Record of Oral Proceedings, CR 2011/5, 21 March 2011 (3 pm), available at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16362.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012], at 34. This
was perhaps a more serious issue than counsel for Makedonija characterized it to be, if one
is reminded, for instance, of analogous disputes in the Middle East about the ‘ownership’ of
falafel; anthropologists rightly insist that food and identity are inextricably linked, especially
in post-independence contexts: see e.g. M. K. Janeja, Transactions in Taste (Routledge, 2010).
13 Some of the cultural terms of the dispute are well summarized by J. Romm, ‘Who was in
Tomb II?’, London Review of Books, vol. 33, issue 19, 6 October 2011, at 27–28, who clarifies that
those scholars are obviously not exempt from bias either. For an anthropological perspective,
see J.K. Cowan, Macedonia: The Politics of Identity and Difference (Pluto Press, 2000). On the
possible international legal implications of the cultural dispute, see L. Reimer, ‘Macedonia:
Cultural Right or Cultural Appropriation?’, (1995) 53 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 359.
14 The political dimension of the dispute and Makedonija’s international relations from
independence up to the early 2000s are well described by the former head of the UN
Preventive Deployment Force in H.J. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN
Experience in Preventive Diplomacy (US Institute of Peace Press, 2003).
15 Counter-Memorial of Greece, supra, note 11, at 15.
16 See ibid., paras. 2.9–2.13.
17
Ibid., para. 2.34.
18 See Application instituting proceedings, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files
/142/14879.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012], at 166.
19 ArbitrationCommission of the Conference on Yugoslavia, ‘OpinionNo. 6 on the Recognition
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the constitution and the flag of the country have been amended precisely to as-
suage such fears.20 The internal situation in Makedonija is also complicated by
its relationship with its other neighbours Bulgaria, Albania and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Serbia. Claiming the ‘Macedonian’ heritage of a ‘Macedonian’ nation is an
essential element in that picture.21
2 The obligation to negotiate and its
deflection
Despite this overall complexity, mutual relations between Greece and Make-
donija are much better now than they were in the early 1990s, when the conflict
threatened to become much more serious. Greece initially refused to recog-
nize Makedonija as a state and was quite successful in its diplomatic efforts to
make sure that other European countries delayed their recognition despite the
favourable Badinter Commission’s report.22 In 1993, Makedonija succeeded in
gaining admission to the United Nations, but Greek opposition led to the terms
of resolution 817 (1993), according to which the country would be “provision-
ally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that [had]
arisen over the name of the State”.23 Negotiations continued. The Interim Ac-
cord of 1995 accomplished the objective of normalizing day-to-day relations
with Greece, although the parties could only agree in writing to refer to each
other as ‘The Party of the First Part’ (Greece) and ‘The Party of the Second Part’
(Makedonija). They assumed the obligation to continue the negotiations, al-
though explicitly reserving their positions. This was meant to ‘cool down’ the
conflict. According to Article 5:
of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and Its Member States’,
11 January 1992, Annex III to supra, note 18, at 46.
20The first flag ofMakedonija included, with a different background colour, the Star of Vergina,
a symbol which can also be found in the flag of the Greek region of Makedonia / Μακεδονία.
The significance of that is explained by Romm, supra, note 13. Makedonija subsequently
renounced all official use of the Star in Article 7 of the Interim Accord (supra, note 3).
21 See generally J. Engström, ‘The Power of Perception: The Impact of theMacedonianQuestion
on Inter-ethnic Relations in the Republic ofMacedonia’, (2002) 1Global Review of Ethnopolitics
3 (“At the heart of the Macedonian Question are conflicting perceptions and dogmas of
the ethnic origin of the Macedonian nation, and the specific question of whether a distinct
Macedonian nation actually exists.”).




1. The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security
Council resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement
on the difference described in that resolution and in Security
Council resolution 817 (1993)
2. Recognizing the difference between them with respect to the
name of the Party of the Second Part, each Party reserves all of
its rights consistent with the specific obligations undertaken in
this Interim Accord. The Parties shall co-operate with a view to
facilitating their mutual relations notwithstanding their respective
positions as to the name of the Party of the Second Part. In
this context, the Parties shall take practical measures, including
dealing with the matter of documents, to carry out normal trade
and commerce between them in a manner consistent with their
respective positions in regard to the name of the Party of the
Second Part. The Parties shall take practical measures so that the
difference about the name of the Party of the Second Part will not
obstruct or interfere with normal trade and commerce between
the Party of the Second Part and third parties.24
In the Accord, Greece finally recognized Makedonija as a state and agreed to
cooperate with it in various ways. Crucially, Greece also undertook the obliga-
tion not to object to Makedonija’s admission to international organizations, so
long as the provisional name would be used. Article 11(1), which was to become
central to the dispute before the ICJ, provided:
Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First
Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership
of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and
regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the
First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves
the right to object to any membership referred to above if and
to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in
such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of
United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).25
24 Interim Accord, supra, note 3.
25
Ibid.
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In exchange, Makedonija modified its flag and accepted other important
“confidence-building” obligations.26
This was perhaps not such a good deal for Makedonija—albeit a necessary
one at the time. In its successful struggle to seek a swift integration in
the international community, Makedonija chose to pay a considerable price
in terms of its legal rights. Without the Interim Agreement of 1995, the
basic position in international law as to the name dispute would have been
clearly in favour of Makedonija. Countries have a sovereign right to call
themselves by a name of their choosing. This may be construed either a
simple corollary of sovereignty, or as part of basic self-determination principles.
In the case of Makedonija, this is all the more so given that the name
‘Macedonia’ was already in use before its 1991 independence as the name
of the corresponding Yugoslavian territorial unit (the ‘Socialist Republic of
Macedonia’). The concept of uti possidetis iuris is meant to avoid unnecessary
‘fratricidal struggles’ on the position of borders once independence is gained
through self-determination.27 It may perhaps be extended by analogy to the
question of the name of a state—the point would be that Makedonija already
had a right to call itself Macedonia, because that was its name, and that right
persisted, insofar as it already existed, even after gaining independence and
dropping the word ‘Socialist’ therefrom. With the exception of some biased
voices to the contrary,28 the best academic opinion at the time supported
Makedonija’s right to call itself the ‘Republic ofMacedonia’.29 In the case before
the ICJ examined here, even the Respondent, Greece, accepted that it would in
the abstract be Makedonija’s ‘prerogative’ to call itself whatever it wants. As
Professor Crawford put it:
The key point about Article 5 is that it entails an agreement by the
Applicant not to exercise its prerogative of determining its name
26 See supra, note 20.
27 See Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554, at 565,
para. 20.
28 See e.g. M.D. Poulakidas, ‘Macedonia: Far More Than a Name to Greece’, (1994–1995) 18
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 397.
29 See e.g. M.C.R. Craven, ‘What’s in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
and Issues of Statehood’, (1995) 16 Aust. YBIL 199, at 234–5. Contra, see I. Bantekas,
‘The Authority of States to Use Names in International Law and the Macedonian Affair:
Unilateral Entitlements, Historic Title, and Trademark Analogies’, (2009) 22 LJIL 563 (the
author advocates the relevance of the maxim prior in tempore, potior in iure, and draws an
analogy with the law on trademarks, to reach the conclusion that Makedonija is not entitled
to the use of the term ‘Macedonia’).
176 Francesco Messineo
for itself. […] The only rule of general international law is that it
is for each State to determine its own name, just as it is to determine
its own flag, or its national anthem. The national song of Poland,
I might say, begins with the words ‘O, Lithuania’, but no one has
ever complained!30
Indeed, in Greece’s view, the Interim Accord changed everything, as it imposed
on Makedonija an obligation to negotiate with another country its own name.
Or did it?
A cunning deflection strategy soon emerged in Makedonija. First, the
country would seek to be recognized with its ‘constitutional’ name by as many
other states as possible. Second, authorities would insist on always using
only the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ in every international setting—even
when referred to by other states and international organizations as ‘the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’. The consistency in this regard was
particularly irritating to Greece, whose counsel resorted to describing some of
Makedonija’s acts as “childish”.31 Third, the negotiations with Greece mandated
by Article 5(1) of the Interim Accord were approached on the basis that the
international use of the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ was not negotiable:
Makedonija was only prepared to discuss a suitable name to be employed in
bilateral relations betweenMakedonija and Greece. This position, known as the
‘dual formula’, was seen by Greece as an unlawful strategy aimed at avoiding
meaningful negotiations on the name issue despite the precise commitment
to engage therein under Article 5(1) of the Interim Accord.32 In summary, the
parties could no longer even agree onwhat their disagreement exactly consisted
in. Negotiations all but froze, while recognition of the name ‘Republic of
Macedonia’ by third countries was on the rise.
Irrespective of its legality or good faith, this was an excellent strategy from
Makedonija’s perspective. Makedonija gained admittance to many interna-
tional organizations,33 and many states recognized it under its constitutional
name. All was well until it all worked too well. In the mid-2000s, the United
30Verbatim Record of Oral Proceedings, CR 2011/12, 30 March 2011 (3 pm), available at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16390.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012], at 32.
31 Rejoinder of Greece, 27 October 2010, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/
16360.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012], para. 7.32.
32 See the 2008 remarks by Makedonija’s President in his Parliament reported in the Greek
Counter-Memorial, supra, note 11, para. 3.47, and the Greek position thereupon, paras. 3.48,
4.9, and 8.39.
33 Judgment, supra, note 5, para. 22.
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States of America and a series of other powerful countries joined the ranks of
those recognizing Makedonija’s constitutional name.34 Understandably wor-
ried that it might be put before an irreversible series of faits accomplis, Greece
hardened its position andmade it clear to everyone in intergovernmental, diplo-
matic, and media circles that it intended to put some pressure back on Make-
donija at the negotiation table by objecting to its admission to NATO, which
was due to be decided upon at the Bucharest Summit of 2008.35 Because of its
consensus-based decision-making process, NATO ended up unanimously de-
ciding not to extend an invitation to Makedonija until the name dispute was
solved.36 Makedonija’s reaction was to bring a case against Greece before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), lamenting a breach of Article 11(1) of the
Accord.
3 Greece’s breach of Article 11(1)
3.1 The ostensibly simple case of Makedonija vs. the
complex reply of Greece
Against this background, the first thing to note about the judgment is that the
Court was prevented from deciding the crucial underlying question—whether
Makedonija had the right, under international law, to choose for itself the name
‘Republic of Macedonia’. By virtue of Article 21(2) of the Interim Accord, the
International Court of Justice could be seized of “any difference or dispute”
arising between Greece and Makedonija concerning “the interpretation or
implementation” of the Accord, except “the difference referred to in Article 5,
paragraph 1”, that is the “difference described in [Security Council] resolution
[845 (1993)] and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993)”. In other words, the
Court had no jurisdiction over the “difference … arisen over the name of the
State” mentioned in resolution 817 (1993) and, according to Greece, neither had
it as to the “remaining issues between them” mentioned in SC resolution 845
(1993).
Counsel for Makedonija was very successful in convincing the Court that
the dispute before it had, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the name issue.
Makedonija sought a declaration that Greece had breached its obligation under
Article 11(1) not to object to Makedonija’s membership of NATO. Greece had
34 See Counter-Memorial of Greece, supra, note 11, para. 2.31.




indeed objected, and it had not done so for the only reason it would have been
allowed to do so under Article 11(1). It was, as Professor Sands put it before
the Court, a “simple and narrow case of pacta sunt servanda”:37 the Court did
not need to enmesh itself with NATO’s decisions or procedures, nor with the
name dispute. Indeed, the Court was not asked to decide whether the Party of
the Second Part should be called FYROM, Macedonia, or, for that matter, “the
Republic of South Australia”.38 It was, onMakedonija’s terms, an easy case. Not
so for Greece.
For reasons that, with the benefit of hindsight, appear perhaps strategically
unwise, Greece decided that it would not seek a separate judgment on prelimi-
nary objections, but that it would be prepared to join its arguments on the ques-
tion of jurisdiction with those on the merits of the case. The resulting written
and oral proceedings by Greece are very complex. In its most simplified form,
Greece’s line of defence can be understood as a series of no less than nine hier-
archical propositions, each subsidiary to all the preceding ones in the following
order:
1. The Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 21(2) of the Interim Accord
because the dispute was inextricably connected to the name issue which
was reserved for settlement through negotiation between the parties.
2. Even if the Court found that the dispute could be understood separately
from the name issue, the Court lacked jurisdiction because it was not
Greece which had objected to Makedonija’s admission to NATO: the
relevant act was attributable to NATO, not Greece.
3. Even if the act was also attributable toGreece, NATO and/or itsmembers
would have had to be necessary parties to the dispute, and the Monetary
Gold principle prevented the Court from exercising jurisdiction.39
4. Even if the Monetary Gold principle did not apply, the Court should
refrain from exercising jurisdiction to protect its judicial function, as the
decision would not be susceptible of any practical effect: the Court could
not order NATO to admit Makedonija.40
37 Verbatim Record of Oral Proceedings, supra, note 12, at 21.
38
Ibid., at 28.
39 See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v France, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and United States of America) (Preliminary Question), ICJ Reports 1954, p.
19.
40Note how this point potentially contradicts the assertion sub (1) that any decision on the issue
would necessarily impact upon the name issue.
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5. The term “not to object” in Article 11(1) must be interpreted narrowly. The
conduct of Greece should not be seen as an objection strictu sensu, but as
an exercise of its duty of participation to the consensus-forming under
NATO rules and procedures, which prevailed over the Interim Accord by
virtue of Article 22 of the Accord.
6. Even if the conduct by Greece was deemed an objection, it was an objec-
tion permitted by the second clause of Article 11(1), because Makedonija
would be referred to in NATO differently than “the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia”: Makedonija itself would carry on its practice of
calling itself “the Republic of Macedonia”.
7. Even if Greek conduct was not permitted under either Article 22 or
Article 11(1), it was permitted because Makedonija had breached many
of its correlative obligations under the Accord, including eschewing
meaningful negotiations through the “dual formula”, and Greece was
therefore entitled to invoke the exception of non-performance (exceptio
non adimpleti contractus).
8. Even if the exceptio non adimpleti contractus were not a recognized rule
under international law, the treaty obligation under Article 11(1) was sus-
pended under the terms of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
because Makedonija’s breaches amounted to ‘material breaches’ and
Greece relied on the “defence” mechanism of Article 65.
9. Failing all of the above, this was a case of legitimate countermeasures
under the law of state responsibility.
The more persuasive the subsidiary arguments are, the more the arguments just
heard by the Court on the points immediately before are undermined—even
if they would not need to be as a matter of formal logic. As all uncles and
aunts know, the arguments ‘You are not my mum’, followed by ‘It was not me,
uncle/auntie’, followed by ‘I actually did it because she hit me first’ end up being
all mutually exclusive even if one of them may be, on close analysis, correct. So
Greece had to plead at the same time that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear
the case, that there was no breach, and that the breach was excusable because
Makedonija had also breached the rules, including some over which the Court
supposedly had no jurisdiction. Another contradiction was that Greece pleaded
that the judgment was not going to be capable of having any legal effect, while
also arguing that it would actually adversely prejudice the negotiations—over
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which the Court had no jurisdiction—by creating irreversible legal effects. As
Judge Simma put it in his separate opinion, counsel for Greece did an excellent
job in very difficult circumstances—but “ad impossibilia nemo tenetur”.41
3.2 The Court’s decision on jurisdiction
The Court proceeded to tear Greece’s arguments apart one by one. As to the
argument that the Court’s decision would fall under the exclusion in Article
21(2), the Court held the question of “which name should be agreed upon at the
end of the negotiations between the Parties under the auspices of the United
Nations” was the only one that the Court could not adjudicate upon, while the
question of the violation of Article 11(1) was a separate one:
The fact that there is a relationship between the dispute submitted
to the Court and the name difference does not suffice to remove
that dispute from the Court’s jurisdiction. […] Only if the Court
were called upon to resolve specifically the name difference, or to
express any views on this particular matter, would the exception
under Article 21, paragraph 2, come into play. This is not the
situation facing the Court in the present case.42
As to Greece’s argument that the relevant conduct under dispute was to be
attributed to NATO rather than Greece, the Court agreed withMakedonija that
this was a misrepresentation of the object of the dispute. It was Greek conduct
in the run up to the Bucharest summit that came into consideration, not the
Summit decision itself:
The Court notes that the Applicant is challenging the Respondent’s
conduct in the period prior to the taking of the decision at the
end of the Bucharest Summit and not the decision itself. The
issue before the Court is thus not whether NATO’s decision
may be attributed to the Respondent, but rather whether the
Respondent violated the Interim Accord as a result of its own
conduct. Nothing in the Application before the Court can be
interpreted as requesting the Court to pronounce on whether
41 Judge Simma, Separate Opinion, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16829
.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012], para. 3. Some self-contradiction by Greece was also hinted
at in the Court’s judgment, supra, note 5, para. 107.
42 Judgment, supra, note 5, para. 37.
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NATO acted legally in deferring the Applicant’s invitation for
membership in NATO. Therefore, the dispute does not concern,
as contended by the Respondent, the conduct of NATO or the
member States of NATO, but rather solely the conduct of the
Respondent.43
This made the question of the Monetary Gold principle irrelevant, because
Greece’s “conduct [could] be assessed independently of NATO’s decision, and
the rights and obligations of NATO and its member States other than Greece
[did] not form the subject-matter of the decision of the Court”.44
Furthermore, the Court was not persuaded that its judgment would have
no practical result:
While the Respondent is correct that a ruling from the Court
could not modify NATO’s decision in the Bucharest Summit or
create any rights for the Applicant vis-à-vis NATO, such are not
the requests of the Applicant. […] The Applicant is not requesting
the Court to reverse NATO’s decision in the Bucharest Summit
or to modify the conditions for membership in the Alliance.
Therefore, the Respondent’s argument that the Court’s Judgment
in the present case would not have any practical effect because the
Court cannot reverse NATO’s decision or change the conditions
of admission to NATO is not persuasive.45
And finally, as to the argument that the judgment would intervene in political
issues and the Court should thus refrain to adjudicate for judicial propriety, the
Court predictably used its classic arguments on the nature of the dispute: there
was a legal dispute between the parties over which the Court had jurisdiction,
and there was no reason to refrain from exercising it just because there would
be some political implications to that legal decision.46
3.3 The obligation ‘not to object’ to NATO membership
Once the Court established that it had jurisdiction, it went on to consider










organizations meant. The Court was not persuaded by Greece’s argument that
the consensus procedures employed by NATO implied that no formal ‘veto’
could be exercised by Greece, thus relieving Greece of responsibility:
[N]othing in the text of [Article 11(1)] limits the Respondent’s obli-
gation not to object to organizations that use a voting procedure to
decide on the admission of new members. There is no indication
that the Parties intended to exclude fromArticle 11, paragraph 1, or-
ganizations like NATO that follow procedures that do not require
a vote. Moreover, the question before the Court is not whether
the decision taken by NATO at the Bucharest Summit with re-
spect to the Applicant’s candidacy was due exclusively, principally,
or marginally to the Respondent’s objection. As the Parties agree,
the obligation under the first clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, is one
of conduct, not of result.47
It was also accepted by Greece that the grounds for its objection lay in the
difference over the name, not on other grounds.48 This was fatal to Greece’s
claim. Greece had indeed objected because the name dispute had not yet been
resolved:
In the view of the Court, the evidence submitted to it demonstrates
that through formal diplomatic correspondence and through
statements of its senior officials, the Respondent made clear be-
fore, during and after the Bucharest Summit that the resolution
of the difference over the name was the “decisive criterion” for the
Respondent to accept the Applicant’s admission toNATO. The Re-
spondent manifested its objection to the Applicant’s admission to
NATO at the Bucharest Summit, citing the fact that the difference
regarding the Applicant’s name remained unresolved.49
Contrary to what was pleaded by Greece, such objection was not permitted
under the second clause of 11(1). Greece had argued that because Makedonija
would refer to itself as the ‘Republic of Macedonia’ rather than ‘the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in NATO, the country was indeed going






Ibid., para. 81. See also para. 82.
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Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993)’. Because of this language in
the second clause of Article 11(1), Greece had no obligation not to object to
Makedonija’s membership of NATO. So the question before the Court was
whether Makedonija’s use of its constitutional name indeed triggered the
exception or not.50 The Court found that the use of passive voice (‘to be
referred to’) was relevant against Greece’s construction.51 Crucially, the Court
found that the Interim Accord “nowhere” required Makedonija to use “the
provisional designation in its dealings with Greece”.52 This had fundamental
consequences—if the parties had wanted Makedonija to change its practice,
they would have agreed as much:
[A]lthough the Parties were aware of the Applicant’s consistent
use of its constitutional name in the United Nations, the Parties
drafted the second clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, without using
language that calls for a change in the Applicant’s conduct.53
Such an important commitment for Makedonija would not have been intro-
duced just by implication.54 In summary, the text of Article 11(1), together with
the object and purpose of the Accord, did not “permit the Respondent to object
to the Applicant’s admission to or membership in an organization because of
the prospect that the Applicant would refer to itself in that organization using
its constitutional name”.55 The practice of both parties in the application of the
Accord confirmed this.56
Furthermore, Greece’s obligation not to object to Makedonija’s member-
ship of NATO was not qualified by Article 22 of the Interim Accord. Article 22
provided as follows:
This Interim Accord is not directed against any other State or
entity and it does not infringe on the rights and duties resulting
from bilateral and multilateral agreements already in force that
50




Ibid., para. 95. The Court also noted that the practice in bilateral relations was relevant: by
virtue of Article 5, the Parties had found a modus vivendi whereby each would be using their
preferred name in diplomatic correspondence with the other party, and affix seals with the
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the Parties have concluded with other States or international
organizations.
According to Greece, this meant that if its duty to participate in NATO decision
procedures conflicted with the Accord, the NATO treaty obligation would
prevail. The Court noted that even if this interpretation of Article 22 had been
correct, it would still be necessary for Greece to show that it indeed had ‘a duty’
under the NATO treaty to object to Makedonija’s membership. In the Court’s
opinion there was no such duty:
The Respondent offers no persuasive argument that any provision
of the North Atlantic Treaty required it to object to the Appli-
cant’s membership. Instead the Respondent attempts to convert
a general “right” to take a position on membership decisions into
a “duty” by asserting a “duty” to exercise judgment as to member-
ship decisions that frees the Respondent from its obligation not to
object to the Applicant’s admission to an organization. This ar-
gument suffers from the same deficiency as the broader interpre-
tation of Article 22 initially advanced by the Respondent, namely,
that it would erase the value of the first clause of Article 11, para-
graph 1. Thus, the Court concludes that the Respondent has not
demonstrated that a requirement under the North Atlantic Treaty
compelled it to object to the admission of the Applicant toNATO.57
In summary, Greece had breached its obligation under Article 11 of the Interim
Accord. This was, however, not the end of the matter. Could the conduct of
Greece be somehow otherwise justified?
In this regard, counsel for Greece did not spare any conceivable line of
defence, but, in essence, its three-pronged argument boiled down to a tu quoque.
Because in its view Makedonija had also repeatedly breached the Interim
Accord, Greece was entitled to invoke the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, or the
rules on treaty suspension in the law of treaties, or the rules on countermeasures
in the law of state responsibility. However, conscious of its arguments on
jurisdiction, counsel for Greece chose not to file a counter-claim for the alleged
breaches. In other words, Greece did not seek a declaration that Makedonija
had breached the Accord: it only wished the Court to rejectMakedonija’s claim.
The Court did not find that Greece had sufficiently proven thatMakedonija
had been in breach of the Accord, except for one relatively minor breach
57
Ibid., para. 111.
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occurred in 2004 which was, in the Court’s view, entirely unrelated to the
objection by Greece to Makedonija’s membership of NATO.58 Even if a rule
on the exceptio non adimpleti contractus existed as Greece had envisaged it, its
conditions would not have been met (so the Court need not even consider if the
exceptio existed or not).59 Furthermore, Makedonija’s breach did not constitute
a ‘material’ breach for the purposes of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties,60 nor was Greece’s objection to Makedonija’s membership
of NATO a countermeasure taken ‘for the purposes of achieving a cessation’ of
that breach by Makedonija.61
In sum, in its dispositif the Court reached the conclusion that ‘the Hellenic
Republic, by objecting to the admission of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia to NATO, [had] breached its obligation under Article 11, paragraph
1, of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995’. The Court refused to also declare
that Greece should avoid repeating such violation in the future because its ‘good
faith must be presumed’.62
4 The judgment as an intervention in the
name dispute
In finding that Greece had breached Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord, the
Court insisted that it did not, as such, express a view on the name dispute.63
Under Article 21(2), the Court decided it had jurisdiction over anything except
choosing a name for Makedonija.64 Judge Xue and Judge ad hoc Roucounas
disagreed: in their view, the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case inter




Ibid., para. 161. In his Separate Opinion, Judge Simma filled the gap which the Court left
open as to the exceptio non adimpleti contractus and clarified that, as a matter of contemporary
international law, there is no space left for the concept of exceptio non adimpleti contractus
beyond what has been codified in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
(See supra,, note 41). Indeed, any suggestion to the contrary would create much instability in
the law and practice of international treaties, as states could unilaterally choose to forego the












name issue.65 In this regard, the present author does not dispute that, as amatter
of technical legal construction, it was perfectly reasonable for the Court to reach
the conclusion it did as to jurisdiction. Incidentally, the judgment on the merits
was eminently sensible: this was indeed a simple case of pacta sunt servanda,
Greece having clearly breached its obligation under Article 11. However, the
implications of the decision for the broader name dispute are so crucial that
one wonders whether a more expansive interpretation of the exception to the
Court’s jurisdiction in Article 21(2) would have been warranted in view of the
parties’ initial wish to keep the name dispute outside the purview of the Court’s
jurisdiction. This is because, in order to reach its conclusion, the Court had to
consider the negotiation technique employed by Makedonija—including the so
called ‘dual formula’—and to adjudicate, albeit incidentally, on its legality.
First, we saw that the Court found that, in the Interim Accord, Makedonija
had not undertaken any obligation to call itself ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’.66 Although this is probably correct, it must be noted that this was
one of the key differences between the parties and a crucial divisive element
during the negotiations. Second, the Court found that Makedonija had not
breached its obligation under Article 5 to negotiate in good faith with Greece.
The Court first recalled its previous jurisprudence on the concept of good faith
negotiations,67 and then went on to consider the evidence before it, concluding
that since Makedonija had in fact declared itself open also to solutions that
differed from the ‘dual formula’,68 there was no proof that it had not negotiated
in good faith so far.69
However, the Court crucially stopped short of saying that the ‘dual formula’
was in itself not a legitimate negotiation position under Article 5. In Judge Xue’s
view, the disagreement between the parties on the ‘dual formula’ was at the heart
of the legal dispute before the parties—and it was this that put the case outside
the Court’s jurisdiction:
The so-called “dual formula”, as revealed in the proceedings,
refers to the formula whereby, ultimately, the provisional name
65 See Judge Xue, Dissenting Opinion, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142
/16833.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012], at 1–4 and Judge ad hoc Roucounas, Dissenting
Opinion, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/142/16835.pdf> [last accessed 22
April 2012], at 6–8.





69See ibid., paras. 133–8. It is worth noting that the burden of proof of Makedonija’s ‘bad faith’
was on Greece.
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will be used only between the Respondent and the Applicant,
while the Applicant’s constitutional name is used with all other
States. Although the Court rightly concludes that, by virtue of
Article 11, paragraph 1, the Applicant is not precluded from using
its constitutional name when referring to itself in international
organizations under resolution 817 and the Interim Accord, such
a “dual formula”, whose implication for the pending negotiations
does not seem immaterial, was obviously not contemplated by the
Parties when they concluded the Interim Accord. Furthermore,
when such a formula is allegedly pursued intentionally, the matter
clearly has a bearing on the final settlement of the name issue. The
question in the present case, therefore, is in essence not about the
Respondent’s position regarding the Applicant’s membership in
NATO under Article 11, paragraph 1, but about the difference in
the negotiation process.70
As a matter of fact, it cannot be denied that the judgment had a clear impact on
the negotiating positions.
In its written pleadings, Greece had predicted that this might happen. In
its arguments on jurisdiction, it declared that “a Judgment in favour of the
FYROMwould judicially seal a unilateral practice of imposing a disputed name
and would thus run contrary to Security Council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845
(1993), requiring the Parties to reach a negotiated solution on this difference”.71
And seal it it did. Indeed, the practice of calling itself ‘the Republic ofMacedonia’
has been declared lawful by the judgment, and the ‘dual formula’ was not
explicitly deemed a breach of the obligation to negotiate in good faith. These
were both clear interventions on the name dispute.
5 On the protection of the common heritage
of humanity
In his closing oral statement before the Court, the Agent for Makedonija
remarked once again why this case was important to his country. The
Macedonian identity, he said, was no longer a question of choice for his people,
because history had run its course:
70 Judge Xue, Dissenting Opinion, supra, note 65, para. 3.
71 Rejoinder of Greece, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16360.pdf> [last
accessed 22 April 2012], para. 76.
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Although it is not a matter before this Court for resolution, the
principal difference that divides us concerns the name of my
country, with all that implies to our nationality, our language and
our identity. Due to the Respondent’s opposition, we have suffered
delays and setbacks in our quest for international recognition
and legitimacy, often compromising the interests for stability in
the region. Several learned counsel on behalf of the Respondent
referred to the purported “choice” of our name as our crime. Yet
for us, it was not a choice. Our name was the result of a long historic
process; indeed, born as Macedonians, speaking the Macedonian
language, it is not as if we had alternative identities to choose from.72
The response of the Agent for Greece reiterated her country’s concerns for the
implications of what was perceived by Greece as a cultural misappropriation—
once again by reference to maps and school textbooks:
[I]n speaking of its disinterest in monopolizing the contested
name, the Applicant trivializes an issue of grave and genuine
concern to my country. This is an attempt to mislead the
international community about the Applicant’s real intentions in
this regard which are far from innocent. Those real intentions
can be gained from textbooks, maps, encyclopaedias, statements
of its officials, all alleging historical injustice and asserting, as
Greece showed in its pleadings, that the Applicant’s “geographical
and ethnic boundaries” extend beyond its present day borders and
cover territories that are under “Greek” or “Bulgarian” “rule”. This,
Mr. President, is a real threat to regional peace and stability.73
Even if theGreek perspective on the history of the regionwere the right one, the
question of Makedonija’s identity cannot be brushed off as a deliberate series
of scholarly mistakes by its school teachers and University professors. National
identity is always socially and politically constructed—and a Macedonian state
in the Balkans is nowadays an unavoidable fact, a fait accompli. In that
72Verbatim Record of Oral Proceedings, CR 2011/11, 28 March 2011 (10 am), available at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16386.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012], paras.
56–7 (emphasis added).
73 Verbatim Record of Oral Proceedings, CR 2011/12, 30 March 2011 (3 pm), available at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16390.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012], para. 14
(emphasis added).
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regard, although international lawyers cannot offer solutions, they can propose
methods of settlement of disputes. As we saw earlier, even in the most skewed
accounts there is a recognition that some heritage is in fact shared between
the two countries.74 Although this may sound naïve, a medium-term objective
in furtherance of the Interim Agreement may be that of fostering academic
and cultural dialogue across the borders of the two countries—perhaps starting
precisely from a joint study of this shared heritage. As the general principles on
the protection of cultural property show, and as UNESCO constantly advises,
certain elements of world culture (such as Alexander the Great’s empire and
the literature that came therewith) are the common heritage of the whole of
humanity, not of a specific country.75 It is the responsibility of Makedonija and
Greece to find an intelligible way to share and preserve their collective heritage
rather than attempt to litigate it before international courts.
The Court concluded its reasoning by “emphasiz[ing] that the 1995 Interim
Accord places the Parties under a duty to negotiate in good faith under the
auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to the
pertinent Security Council resolutions with a view to reaching agreement
on the difference described in those resolutions”.76 The collective future of
Makedonija and Greece is as partners in the European Union and NATO, not
as opposing sides in a never-ending conflict over Makedonija’s name. While
there is no denial that this a serious dispute over matters which touch upon
the identity of both countries, it is equally obvious that these are no longer
times for such disagreements. In timeswhen the principle of self-determination
of peoples has become a peremptory norm of international law, and foreign
domination through colonization is no longer acceptable let alone something to
be proud of, onewonderswhether the ‘real’ heritage of past historical pan-Asian
conquests is a legitimate point of international dispute. As Scipio Aemilianus
allegedly acknowledged just after having destroyedCarthage on behalf of Rome,
human glory is forever ephemeral.77 Whomever Alexander the Great ‘belongs’
to, at some point his empire fell, as all empires (and their subsequent shadows)
74
Supra, note 8 and accompanying text.
75 See Article 6(1), Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage 1972, 1037UNTS 151 (bothMakedonija andGreece are parties thereto); see also Con-
vention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003, available at <http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001897/189761e.pdf> [last accessed 22 April 2012].
76 Judgment, supra, note 5, para. 166.
77 Polybius (208–118 BCE) tells us of the tears shed by the Roman general after having
accomplished the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE: Histories, XXXVIII, 22, English trans-
lation at <http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/38*.html> [last
accessed 22 April 2012].
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are thankfully bound to do.
